Monetary Policy Reaction to Geopolitical Risks in Unstable Environments

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Outline

1. Research question

2. Methodology

3. Results

Motivation

- World economy has been increasingly influenced by geopolitical considerations (Ukraine, Middle East, China-US, etc.)
- Geopolitical risk shocks affect the economy through different channels
- Some of them are *inflationary*: such as the commodity price channel, especially the oil price (Mignon and Saadaoui, 2024), and the currency channel (Gopinath, 2015)
- Some other channels are *deflationary*: such as the consumer sentiment channel and the financial condition channel (Forbes and Warnock, 2012)
- It is difficult to determine ex ante whether geopolitical risk shocks are inflationary or deflationary
- Recent research suggests that geopolitical shocks tend to be inflationary throughout history (Caldara et al., 2024)
- How do geopolitical risk shocks impact monetary policy?

Motivation

- More interconnected economies: Since the early 2000s, the world economy has faced numerous geopolitical events (e.g., 9/11, the first war in Ukraine, the China-U.S. trade dispute, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the second war in Ukraine
- Global business cycle and global financial cycle: (e.g., Kose et al., 2003, Monfort et al., 2003, Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2010, Ginn, 2023a, Ginn, 2023b, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2020)
- Policymakers can respond to global shocks by implementing accommodating monetary policies to counteract negative impacts on economic activity and limiting international financial spillovers

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Motivation

- Our empirical investigation will focus on the effects of geopolitical risks as an exogenous source of uncertainty
- High levels of uncertainty can affect the economic decision-making of individuals and companies, based on the theory of real options (Bernanke, 1983), where uncertainty can increase the option value of waiting (Bloom, 2009)
- Consequently, geopolitical uncertainty leads to a "wait-and-see" approach, thereby influencing the decision of economic agents. This could be illustrated by the *consumer sentiment channel* explored in Caldara et al. (2024)

Preview of the results

- We estimate an augmented Taylor rule based on a geopolitical shock via constant and time-varying LP models
- The panel evidence indicates that a geopolitical risk shock implies different monetary policy reactions
- In the short run, the central bank is more accommodative to limiting the negative effects on consumer sentiment
- In the medium run, the central bank is more committed to combating inflation pressures
- After GFC, the monetary policy reaction is stronger
- In case of large GPR shocks, the central bank is more accommodative in the short-run

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
3. Results

Empirical approach

- Monthly data for 18 economies (nine developed economies and nine emerging economies) from February 2000 to Ferbuary 2022 (around 80 percent of global GDP)
- These 20 economies include: Switzerland (CHE), Chile (CHL), Canada (CAN), China (CHN), Columbia (COL), Czech Republic (CZE), the Euro zone (19 countries; EUR), the United Kingdom (GBR), Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), India (IND), Israel (ISR), Japan (JPN), Mexico (MEX), South Korea (KOR), Poland (POL), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA)

Results - Panel (4554 obs.)

Figure 1. Interest rates (RATE) and geopolitical risks (gpr)



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Empirical approach

Taylor rules augmented with geopolitical risks following Aizenman (2011): panel regressions, panel local projections, time-series local projections, time-varying local projections

Panel specification:

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 R_{i,t-12} + \beta_2 GAP_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 INF_{i,t-1}$$
(1)
+ $\beta_3 GPR_{i,t-12} + \beta_4 REC_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t}$

where α_i are country fixed effects to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, *R*, stands for the short-term interest rate; *GAP*, the centered moving average of the output gap; *INF*, is the year-on-year inflation rate; *GPR*, stands for the GPR index, and *REC*, is the recession dummy

Empirical approach

In the local projection specification, we estimate the nominal interest rate for country *i* at time *t* as follows:

$$R_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + \rho_i R_{i,t-1} + \beta_h S_{i,t-k} + \sum_{j=1}^k \nu_j' \mathbf{X}_{i,t-j} + \epsilon_{i,t+h}$$
(2)

- where α_i are country fixed effects to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity, ρ_i is an autoregressive term to account for persistence (the autoregressive term ρ_i is further justified to account for policy inertia) and S_{i,t} is a one unit shock to GPR
- The vector $\mathbf{X}_{i,t}$ of control variables is the same as in Equation (1)
- Following Jordà and Taylor (2024), we proceed to a lag-aumentation to consider non-stationarity. Besides, lag-augmentated Local Projections (LP) perform similarly to the Newey-West correction
- We add one lag for the shock and control variables (thus, k = 2), $\epsilon_{i,t+h}$ relates to the error term at each horizon

Empirical approach

The central bank may be more accommodating in the wake of a large GPR shock to restore household confidence. This, in turn, might explain why the effect for short-run horizons differs from those in the medium run. Finally, the effect of geopolitical risk shock may be different during recessions. The TV-LP model (Inoue et al., JoE 2024) can be formulated as follows:

$$R_{t+h} = c_{t+h} + \beta_{h,t+h} S_t + \sum_{j=1}^{2} v'_{j,t+h} \mathbf{X}_{t-j} + \epsilon_{t+h} \quad h = 0, 1, \dots$$
(3)
IRF(h) = $\beta_{h,t+h}$

- where $\mathbf{X} = (R, INF, GAP, S)'$. The vector of control variables includes the lagged values of the following variables: the short-term interest rate; *R*; the inflation rate, *INF*; the output gap, *GAP*; and the shock on the geopolitical risk index (*GPR*), *S*
- ► The parameter of interest is the time-varying impulse response $\beta_{h,t+h}$ following a shock *S* on the geopolitical risk index; for each T h months, we obtain a specific impulse response function, where *T* is the sample size and *h* is the horizon.

Outline

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
3. Results

| | 1 | | 2 | | 3 | |
|------------------------|----------|-----|---------|-----|---------|-----|
| L12. <i>R</i> | 0.663 | *** | 0.749 | *** | 0.626 | *** |
| | (0.007) | | (0.011) | | (0.010) | |
| GAP | 0.054 | *** | 0.079 | *** | 0.041 | *** |
| | (0.004) | | (0.005) | | (0.006) | |
| INF | 0.358 | *** | 0.228 | *** | 0.394 | *** |
| | (0.011) | | (0.018) | | (0.015) | |
| L12.GPR | 0.774 | *** | 0.896 | *** | 0.357 | |
| | (0.130) | | (0.124) | | (0.257) | |
| REC | -0.069 | | -0.190 | *** | 0.026 | |
| | (0.037) | | (0.040) | | (0.061) | |
| Intercept | -0.211 | *** | -0.340 | *** | 0.058 | |
| | (0.045) | | (0.051) | | (0.075) | |
| Number of observations | 4554 | | 2277 | | 2277 | |
| Number of countries | 18 | | 9 | | 9 | |
| R-squared | 0.86 | | 0.79 | | 0.81 | |
| RMSE | 1.08 | | 0.83 | | 1.26 | |
| AIC | 13604.65 | | 5615.97 | | 7513.55 | |

Table 1. Panel Taylor rule augmented with geopolitical risks


Note: The dependent variable is the short-term interest rate. Model 1 is the model for the full sample. Model 2 is the model for the developed countries sample. Model 3 is the model for the sample of emerging countries. The symbol *** indicate statistical signifiance at the one percent level.

Figure 2. GPR on Interest rates (Full sample)




Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. SE are boostrapped (200 replications) and clusterized at the country level.

Figure 3. GPR on Interest rates (Developed countries)



Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. SE are boostrapped (200 replications) and clusterized at the country level.


Figure 4. GPR on Interest rates (Emerging countries)



Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. SE are boostrapped (200 replications) and clusterized at the country level.

Results - Time series (constant parameter)

Figure 5. GPR on Interest rates (UK)




Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable

Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. *LP* stands for local projections, *gpr* for the GPR index, and *RATE* for the short-term interest rate. IRF coefficients for exogenous variables are dynamic multipliers.

Results - Time series (constant parameter)

Figure 6. GPR on Interest rates (CAN)




Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable

Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. *LP* stands for local projections, *gpr* for the GPR index, and *RATE* for the short-term interest rate. IRF coefficients for exogenous variables are dynamic multipliers.

Results - Time series (constant parameter)


Figure 7. GPR on Interest rates (ISR)



Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable


Notes: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. *LP* stands for local projections, *gpr* for the GPR index, and *RATE* for the short-term interest rate. IRF coefficients for exogenous variables are dynamic multipliers.

Figure 8. GPR on Interest rates in an unstable environment (United Kingdom)




Note: The black curve is the standard LP's IRF, and the green lines depict the time-varying IRF. For each time horizon, we have a specific IRF. Here, we have T = 265 months (from February 2000 to February 2022) and the horizon is equal to h = 15 months, thus we have T - h = 265 - 15 = 250 impulse response functions.

Figure 9. GPR on Interest rates after GFC (United Kingdom)




Note: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. *RATE* stands for the short-term interest rate, *gpr*, stands for the geopolitical risk index. The black curve is the standard LP's IRF, and the green lines depict the time-varying IRF after GFC.

Figure 10. GPR on Interest rates for the top quartile of GPR (United Kingdom)




Note: the shock is a unit shock to GPR. *RATE* stands for the short-term interest rate, *gpr*, stands for the geopolitical risk index. The black curve is the standard LP's IRF, and the green lines depict the time-varying IRF for the top quartile of GPR.

Figure 11. Time-varying parameter plot at horizon t = 2 (United Kingdom)



Note: The time-varying parameters for the IRFs are observed 15 month after the shock. The black line corresponds to the unique IRF's coefficient 1 month after the shock. The blue line corresponds the series of IRFs 1 month after the shock. The sample starts in February 2000 and ends after T - h = 265 - 1 = 264 months in January 2022.

Figure 12. Time-varying parameter plot at horizon t = 15 (United Kingdom)



Note: The time-varying parameters for the IRFs are observed 15 month after the shock. The black line corresponds to the unique IRF's coefficient 15 month after the shock. The blue line corresponds the series of IRFs 15 month after the shock. The sample starts in February 2000 and ends after T-h = 265-15 = 250 months in November 2020.

Final thoughts

Key takeaways

- The panel LP model demonstrates that the reaction of monetary policy depends on the time horizon, especially in the developed country group
- Following a GPR shock, the central bank is more accommodative to limit the negative effects on consumer sentiment
- In the medium term, the central bank is more interested in limiting inflation pressures, which may be due to second-round effects
- The time-varying local projections confirm these findings for the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Israel
- At both short- and medium-term horizons, significant instabilities are detected in the impulse response functions before the GFC when the oil prices were high, and during large-scale geopolitical events, like 9/11 or the London Bombings
- Policymakers responsible of monetary policies are increasingly vigilant about developments in the geopolitical arena